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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AMNESTY DENIALS: MUST
ALIENS BET THEIR LIVES TO GET INTO COURT?
Daniel Kanstroom*
Introduction
The debate over American immigration policy has always
reflected both high ideals and base impulses. This dialectic has
affected immigration law doctrine in distinctive ways. Uncer-
tainty about the constitutional rights of aliens, the power of
Congress and the executive and the proper role of the judiciary
have made immigration law concepts distinctly different from
those in other areas of law.'
Three years ago, Congress once again entered this field.
Passed by a weary legislature at the eleventh hour,2 the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)3 represented
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drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Dean Daniel Coquilette for the financial
support which made this Article possible. Meredith Linsky, Sam Mahlav and Margaret
Monsell also provided invaluable research and technical assistance.
For a historical review of the basic contradictions in immigration law and an
optimistic assessment of the long-term trend in this area, see Schuck, The Transfor-
mation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1984). See also Kurzban, A More
Critical Analysis ofImmigration Law (Book Review), 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1681 (1986)
(reviewing E. Hull, Without Justice for All: The Constitutional Rights of Aliens (1985))
("Imagine a legal system that permits the indefinite incarceration of persons who have
not committed any crime, or the exclusion of people from a nation simply because of
their beliefs and ideas .... ); Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the
Rights of Aliens, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1286 (1983) [hereinafter Developments] (an overview
of the tension between the rights of aliens and the right of the state to limit immigration).
2 See, e.g., Lungren, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 24 San
Diego L. Rev. 277, 283-91 (1987) (describing the controversies and political maneuvering
that accompanied the last-minute passage of IRCA).
3 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). IRCA amends the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch.
477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)) [here-
inafter INA]. This Article will cite by INA section number rather than U.S. Code
section number.
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the culmination of years of debate, acrimony and doctrinal con-
fusion. The law that emerged was a pragmatic compromise. 4
IRCA's two principal provisions-its grant of amnesty to
certain long-term undocumented aliens (legalization), and its
unprecedented sanctions against employers who hire aliens
without permission from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)-reflect a basic historical tension. The amnesty
provision is generous and liberal, essentially rewarding those
who have violated United States law for at least six years.
Employer sanctions, on the other hand, respond to the conven-
tional wisdom that the United States has lost control of its
borders and that unprecedented measures are urgently needed.5
These controversial sanctions were designed to force those al-
iens who could not obtain amnesty to leave the United States,
and to dissuade others from coming. 6
IRCA also contains an unusual restriction on judicial review
of cases in which an amnesty application is denied by the INS.
Judicial review can only take place after the entry of a "final
order of deportation." An alien who desires prompt review of a
legalization denial must voluntarily submit to deportation pro-
ceedings, face possible arrest and waive a variety of procedural
due process rights. This limitation is not unusual in immigration
cases.' But the unusual aspect of IRCA is that it prohibits
4 See Lungren, supra note 2; Isgro, Administrative and Judicial Review of Denials
of Temporary Resident Status, 2 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 473 (1988) (describing tension which
produced the bill as resulting in compromise judicial review provisions); Martin, Judicial
Review of Legalization Denials, 65 Interpreter Releases (Federal Publications) No. 29,
at 757-66 (August 1, 1988) (describing in detail the process by which an alien may gain
review of a legalization denial). There was little controversy over the basic purpose of
IRCA: "to close the back door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal
immigration may remain open." H.R. Rep. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 46
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5649, 5650. The debate
centered on how this goal could best be accomplished without undertaking measures
which would be "inconsistent with our immigrant heritage." Id. at 5653.
' See also the 1981 testimony of Attorney General William French Smith before a
joint congressional subcommittee: "[W]e have lost control of our borders. We have
pursued unrealistic policies. We have failed to enforce our laws effectively." Adminis-
tration's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, and the Subcomm. on -Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981), quoted in Schuck, supra note
1, at 43 n.234.
6 See Lopez & Lopez, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986-The Cure
or Cause of Probl ems?, 25 Idaho L. Rev. 329 (1988-89).
7 See infra note 56 (discussing the existing systems for judicial review of asylum
and adjustment applications).
Judicial Review of Amnesty Denials
Immigration Judges 8 (IJs) from hearing the applicant's amnesty
claim in those deportation proceedings. The applicant must
therefore undergo an administrative hearing she cannot win to
appeal the denial in federal court. This Article explores whether
Congress can so prevent judicial review. Despite the mass of
litigation over many aspects of IRCA, this fundamental question
has yet to be addressed by any court. 9 A related question-
whether IRCA precludes district court review of challenges to
INS rulemaking-was recently answered affirmatively in Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh.0 The Ayuda court did not consider the
theoretical and practical problems caused by IRCA in individual
cases. Nevertheless, the decision will significantly affect future
IRCA litigation. I
Part I of this Article examines the system of administrative
appeals and judicial review contained in IRCA. This analysis
demonstrates the harsh and contradictory nature of the system
in practice. It also reveals that the most troublesome aspect of
IRCA-prohibiting the IJ from hearing the merits of the amnesty
case-may not have been intended by Congress at all. Apart
from this limitation, IRCA's judicial review provisions are very
similar to the systems which have developed for review of de-
nials of "adjustment of status" and "asylum" applications.12 Part
I therefore compares IRCA with these pre-1986 models.
Assuming Congress did intend that applicants exhaust a
futile deportation proceeding to obtain review, Part II of this
8 Immigration Judges, also known as "Special Inquiry Officers," primarily adjudi-
cate exclusion and deportation cases, though they are empowered to hear a wide variety
of immigration matters. Their powers derive from the INA. See INA §§ 101(b)(4) (basic
definition), 235(b) (exclusion), 236(a) (exclusion), 242(b) (deportation), 246 (recission of
adjustment of status). A variety of regulations also define the precise role of these
officers. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 236-242 (1989).
9 The reasons for this, discussed more fully infra note 140 and accompanying text,
have to do with the relative liberality of the INS in approving close cases, the length
of time required to obtain a final denial, the difficulty in generating a theory to challenge
the procedural aspects of IRCA, and the occasional success, to date, in achieving district
court review of Justice Department rulemaking before a rule resulted in a denial in an
individual case.
10 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
"1 Ayuda relegates challenges to regulations to the courts of appeals after the entry
of final orders of deportation, broadly reads the preclusive effect of IRCA on district
court review, and disregards IRCA's scheme for sending cases to the courts of appeals.
The case will likely set the tone for much of the IRCA litigation to come. See infra
notes 128-139 and accompanying text.
12 The Ayuda court noted this similarity. See 880 F.2d at 1337; see also id. at 1354
(Wald, C.J., dissenting).
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Article examines the constitutionality of this provision. This
analysis requires a review of the historical relationship between
Congress and the judiciary in the immigration field. The judi-
ciary has tended to defer to Congress in immigration matters
more than in almost any other area. Further, Congress has
limited the jurisdiction of courts, especially district courts, to
review immigration cases. As a result, doctrinal development
has stagnated. This stagnation could limit the ability of courts
to address the fundamental problems with IRCA. Further, a
traditional method used by courts to avoid jurisdictional limi-
tations-characterization of issues as constitutional-is partic-
ularly problematic in immigration cases.
Part II concludes with a prediction of how courts would
approach IRCA under traditional immigration law doctrine. As
a "quasi-admission" case, IRCA would be deemed constitutional
by most courts, notwithstanding its apparent contradictions and
unfairness. This prediction is based primarily upon the powerful
tradition of judicial deference and the lack of a satisfactory
theory of due process rights for aliens. It is further supported
by a survey of recent cases construing a companion piece of
legislation to IRCA, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments of 1986 (IMFA).' 3 The last section of Part II also seeks
to explain why, despite its apparent unfairness, no challenges
have yet been brought to IRCA.
Courts have considered the basic questions raised by IRCA
when evaluating the impact of similar systems upon citizens.
Part III therefore examines the judicial response to congres-
sional limitations of review in other areas of law, especially
Selective Service classification cases. This survey reveals the
malleable nature of doctrine in these cases. It also indicates the
extent to which jurisdictional decisions turn on underlying con-
ceptions of the constitutional rights at issue. For courts fully to
address the issues raised by IRCA, certain venerable postulates
of immigration law must be modified. In particular, courts must
decide whether the procedural due process rights of aliens are
at least roughly equivalent to those of citizens receiving public
benefits. If this question is answered affirmatively, then the
13 INA §§ 204(h), 245(e).
Judicial Review of Amnesty Denials
constitutional difficulties with IRCA are substantial. Its condi-
tioning of judicial review on the alien's surrender to a futile
administrative proceeding raises substantial theoretical difficul-
ties. These are best resolved with an idealist approach to due
process that yields powerful results with IRCA, and produces
the specific suggestions with which this Article concludes.
I. The Administrative and Judicial Review Mechanisms of the
IRCA Legalization Program
A. A Primer on Legalization
IRCA was primarily designed to address the problem of
undocumented (illegal) immigration. Its basic structure of am-
nesty for certain undocumented aliens and employer sanctions
to deter future undocumented entrants derived from proposals
dating back at least to 1976.14 The best-known provisions of
IRCA 15 offered legalization to certain aliens who entered the
United States before January 1, 1982. The requirements for
legalization included:
1. Continuous unlawful residence in the United States from
January 1, 1982, to the date of application;
2. Continuous physical presence in the United States from
May 1, 1987, to the date of application, except for certain "brief,
casual and innocent absences";
3. General admissibility as an immigrant; and
14 See Lungren, supra note 2, at 278.
,1 IRCA also offered an amnesty opportunity for so-called Special Agricultural
Workers (SAWs). See INA § 210. The SAW provisions on judicial review basically
mirror those of legalization. To be eligible under the SAW program, applicants may
prove either:
1. That they performed "seasonal agricultural services" for at least 90 "man-days"
[sic] during the 12-month period ending on May 1, 1986 and resided in the United States
during that period; or
2. That they performed such services for "at least 90 man-days during each of the
12-month periods ending on May 1, 1984, 1985 and 1986," and resided in the United
States for at least six months in each of the three years.
In addition, all applications must have been filed between June 1, 1987, and No-
vember 30, 1988. Finally, applicants must be "admissible to the United States as an
immigrant," i.e., not subject to certain specific grounds for exclusion. See Isgro, supra
note 4, at 474-75.
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4. Application to INS within the period from May 5, 1987,
through May 4, 1988, or within thirty days of the issuance of an
Order to Show Cause (OSC).16
One of the most important aspects of the legalization pro-
gram was its strict guarantee of confidentiality. Section
245A(c)(5) of IRCA provides as follows:
Neither the Attorney General, nor any other official or
employee of the Department of Justice, or bureau or
agency thereof, may-
(A) use the information furnished pursuant to an
application filed under this section for any purpose
other than to make a determination on the application
17
As discussed in Part III, this guarantee, which was critical to
the success of IRCA, is difficult to reconcile with mandatory
passage through deportation proceedings to obtain judicial re-
view of a legalization denial. 8
16 See INA § 245A. Legalization is a two-stage process. The above requirements
pertain to the first stage, known as temporary resident status. Temporary resident aliens
must apply for permanent residence within a set time period, or they lose the benefit
of amnesty entirely. To obtain permanent residence, a temporary resident must:
0
1. Have continuously resided in the United States since obtaining temporary resi-
dent status, except for "brief, casual and innocent absences";
2. Be physically present in the United States;
3. Not have been convicted of one felony or three misdemeanors in the United
States;
4. Be admissible (with certain specific grounds of inadmissibility waivable); and
5. Demonstrate a knowledge of English and the history and government of the
United States (this requirement may be met by completion of a special course of study).
See INA § 245A(b)(1) and regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3 (1989). Certain specific
grounds of inadmissibility are waived by INA § 245A(d)(2). Others are waivable by the
Attorney General. See INA § 245A(d)(2)(B)(i). INA § 245A(a)(4), however, adds three
specific bases for denial. As is discussed more fully infra notes 33-34 and accompanying
text, an OSC commences deportation proceedings. See Isgro, supra note 4, at 474-75.
17 INA § 210(b)(6), 245A(c)(5). The only exception to this mandate is that infor-
mation submitted with the legalization application may be used to enforce the criminal
provisions of IRCA relating to false statements in the application. This information may
be used to prosecute one who "knowingly and willfully falsifies, misrepresents, conceals,
or covers up a material fact or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations." INA §§ 210(b)(7), 245(c)(6).
11 See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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B. Administrative and Judicial Review Provisions
1. The Administrative Structure
IRCA did not specify exactly how legalization cases 19 were
to be initially processed. By regulations enacted pursuant to
IRCA, however, the Attorney General created a straightforward
mechanism for processing legalization cases. 20 Applications
were preliminarily handled at "Legalization Offices" and then
forwarded to "Regional Processing Facilities" for a final
decision. 21
The statute itself was much more specific about administra-
tive appeals and judicial review of legalization denials. IRCA's
scheme for administrative and judicial review is exclusive. The
INA states: "[t]here shall be no administrative or judicial review
of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of
status under this section except in accordance with this subsec-
tion. '22 The Act then required the Attorney General to establish
"an appellate authority to provide for a single level of adminis-
trative appellate review .... ,,23 Administrative review of legal-
ization cases was also supposed to be largely confined to the
record created below. 24
Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the INS established the
Legalization Appeals Unit (LAU) to decide legalization and
Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) appeals. 25 The regulations
19 Legalization applications are also generically referred to as "adjustment of status"
applications, though they are different from the classic "adjustment of status" to per-
manent residency. See infra note 56.
20 The Attorney General has delegated power under INA § 103 to promulgate
regulations necessary to enforce the Act.
21 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 210.1, 245a.1 (1989). Certain applicants were also permitted to
file SAW applications at United States consular offices, ports of entry and embassies.
See 8 C.F.R. § 210.2 (1989). See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(n)(2) (1989). For an overview of
this administrative structure, see Isgro, supra note 4, at 475-83.
22 INA § 245A(f)(1) (emphasis added). See also INA § 210(e)(1) (regarding SAWs).
13 INA § 245A(f)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
24 INA § 245A(f)(3)(B) states: "administrative appellate review shall be based solely
upon the administrative record established at the time of the determination on the
application and upon such additional or newly discovered evidence as may not have
been available at the time of the determination." As with many other provisions of
IRCA, this section is somewhat unclear. The precise meaning of the terms "may not
have been available" is hardly self-evident, and is not defined in IRCA.
21 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(f) (1989). The regulations also provide that if an application
is denied by the LAU, the applicant must be given a written statement containing the
specific reasons for the denial. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3, 210.2(f), 245a.2(o) (1989).
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preclude further administrative appeals beyond the LAU. They
also explicitly deny jurisdiction to IJs or the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) to hear legalization cases under any circum-
stances.2 6 The position of the Justice Department seems to have
been that proceedings before the Js were encompassed by the
terms "administrative review" and thus within the ambit of the
INA's review restriction, which would prohibit any such review
other than that described in IRCA itself.
2. Judicial Review Provisions
IRCA contains very specific limitations on judicial review
of legalization cases. INA Section 245A(f)(2), for example, pre-
cludes all review, administrative or judicial, of legalization de-
nials based upon "late" filings.2 7 This section reflects the extreme
concern felt by many in Congress that the INS and the federal
courts could be swamped by potential applicants who missed
the cutoff date.
As to all other denials, the statute provides: "There shall
be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of
an order of deportation under section 106."28 This concise pro-
vision masks great complexity. But deportation proceedings are
completely separate from and unrelated to legalization applica-
tions. IRCA in no other way requires applicants to concede that
they are "deportable, '2 9 or to enter deportation proceedings at
26 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3 (1989). The role of Js is described supra note 8. The Board
of Immigration Appeals is entirely a creature of regulations. It is the required avenue
of administrative appeal for exclusion and deportation cases, though it is also empow-
ered to hear other matters. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1989).
27 SAW denials based upon late filings are not so barred from review. For a discus-
sion of IRCA's judicial review provisions, see generally Isgro, supra note 4, and Martin,
supra note 4.
26 INA § 245A(f)(4)(A). INA § 106 provides, inter alia, that jurisdiction to review
"final orders of deportation" is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals, and that
petitions for such review must be filed within six months of the date of the final
deportation order. Section 106 also mandates that habeas corpus review be the sole
means of review of exclusion orders, that all administrative remedies be exhausted
before review can occur, and that every petition for review or habeas corpus state
whether the validity of the challenged order has been previously determined by any
court. See ihfra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
29 Grounds for deportation range from being "excludable" at the time of entry, see
INA § 241(a)(1), and entering illegally, see INA § 241(a)(2), to being a drug addict, see
INA § 241(a)(I 1), or prostitute, see INA § 241(a)(12).
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all.30 IRCA seems to assume that an applicant whose legalization
case is denied will have an order of deportation entered against
her. But the INS is expressly prohibited by the confidentiality
provisions from using the amnesty application to commence
deportation. Thus, the statutory scheme could have been in-
tended to work in one of two ways. Congress could have in-
tended denied applicants simply to resume their illegal exis-
tence, with judicial review acting as a final level of protection
if they happened to be caught. But such an approach contradicts
the logic of employer sanctions: to force illegal aliens out. Since
such aliens would lack employment authorization, they would
immediately enter the class targeted by employer sanctions. It
seems much more plausible that Congress believed that aliens
whose cases were denied by INS would either surrender for
deportation or leave the United States. 31 But this approach uses
judicial review coercively to achieve policy goals, an idea which
ought to be examined very closely by the judiciary.32
10 See INA § 245A(a)(1)(B). Even aliens subject to final orders of deportation were
permitted to stay those proceedings if they were "prima facie' eligible under IRCA. See
8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.l(d), 245a.2(a)(2)(i) (1989). The problem faced by such applicants if
they desire judicial review of a denial, however, is considerable, as described infra note
33.
31 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
32 The statutory standard for judicial review of legalization denials is similarly
perplexing:
Such judicial review shall be based solely upon the administrative record
established at the time of the review by the appellate authority, and the findings
of fact and determinations contained in such record shall be conclusive unless
the applicant can establish abuse of discretion or that the findings are directly
contrary to clear and convincing facts contained in the record considered as a
whole.
INA § 245A(f)(4)(B). Although this Article does not analyze the meaning of this scope
of review provision, it is important to note its ambiguities. Even the Department of
Justice, Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, in a letter dated June 4,
1986, pointed out the following:
The provisions relating to administrative and judicial review are also ambigu-
ous. Administrative review is to be limited to the record existing at the time
an application is denied, but the record on review may be updated. Judicial
review is to be based solely upon the administrative appellate authority. Its
findings and determinations are to be conclusive, unless the court finds an
abuse of discretion or that the "findings are directly contrary to clear and
convincing facts." These standards of review are not the same, and will only
invite controversy and litigation.
H.R. Rep. No. 682, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 116 (1986).
62 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 25
3. Must Aliens Bet Their Lives to Get into Court?
As noted above, an applicant whose legalization case has
been denied must somehow commence deportation proceedings
to obtain judicial review. 33 The only way to do this would be to
present oneself to the INS and request the issuance of an OSC.
34
But the INS may be reluctant to process those who simply
request a deportation proceeding. The INS could refuse to issue
the OSC, thereby preventing prompt judicial review.
Another problem is that IRCA mandated complete confi-
dentiality for legalization applicants. The INS cannot use the
information in a legalization application to commence deporta-
tion proceedings. The confidentiality provisions encouraged par-
ticipation by aliens who would otherwise fear deportation. 35 But
an OSC cannot be issued unless the INS can state a precise
ground of deportability. 36 As a practical matter, the only way
the INS can obtain information to determine deportability is
through the applicant 37 Therefore, those who want timely ju-
dicial review of a legalization denial will likely have to provide
the same information contained in the confidential amnesty ap-
plication. It has been argued that "[t]he difficult choice the alien
must make [between confidentiality and judicial review] simply
mirrors the duality of purpose that runs all through IRCA...
[l]egalize or leave.13 8 But it is fundamentally unfair to include
judicial review within this duality. IRCA, in effect, tells an alien
"3 Applicants against whom final orders of deportation have already been entered
do not face this particular dilemma. But they face another: how to get the case reacti-
vated safely. For an overview of the procedural options available to such applicants,
see Martin, supra note 4, at 763-65.
31 As noted previously, an OSC commences deportation proceedings. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.1 (1989).
31 See Comment, Legalization Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986: Scope of Cotfidentiality Provisions and Problems in Proving Residence, 41 U.
Miami L. Rev. 1077 (1987).
16 See 8 C.F.R. § 242. 1(b) (1989).
7 The INS must prove deportability by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966). Notwithstanding INA § 291, which
shifts the burden to the alien to prove the "time, place and manner of entry," the
government can almost never prove alienage, a critical part of its prima facie case,
without some admission by the alien. But see Corona-Palomera v. INS, 661 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1981) (government procured foreign birth certificates and proved alienage by
similarity of names). See also United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149
(1923) (adverse inference as to alienage may be drawn from alien's silence at hearing).
38 Martin, supra note 4, at 760.
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to accept such procedures as the INS deems appropriate. If you
want judicial review, waive confidentiality and risk deportation,
or leave.
Moreover, deportation proceedings are unpredictable. Al-
though the last hundred years have witnessed a relatively con-
sistent expansion of due process rights for aliens in deportation
proceedings, 39 this development will be meaningless to the ap-
plicant who is compelled to view the proceedings as merely a
means to judicial review. Both the applicant and the INS will
likely strive for hearings that are as quick and simple as possible.
The INS could use the proceedings as an investigatory mecha-
nism: for example, to question the applicant about friends, fam-
ily and employers. 40 But it gets worse. Although most INS
offices take the informal position that those who walk in, walk
39 See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (INS must prove deportability by
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950) (deportation proceedings must conform to requirements of Administrative
Procedures Act).
40 Moreover, a tactical problem is also created by IRCA. Most applicants who are
eligible for legalization will likely be at least prima facie eligible for suspension of
deportation under INA § 244. Such applicants must:
1. Be deportable;
2. Have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of
not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of application (excluding
"brief, casual, and innocent" absences which do not "meaningfully interrupt the contin-
uous physical presence"), INA § 244(b)(2);
3. Prove "good moral character" during the seven year period, INA § 244(a)(1);
4. Prove that their deportation would result in "extreme hardship to the alien or to
his [sic] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence," INA § 244(a)(1).
See also INA § 244(a), (a)(2), (f)(2), (f)(3) (special restrictions on suspension of depor-
tation for aliens deportable under INA § 241(a)(4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16),
(17), (18), (19), and aliens admitted pursuant to INA § 101(a)(15)(J)); 8 C.F.R. § 244.1
(1989) (IJ may authorize suspension of deportation).
Some might also be eligible for political asylum or withholding of deportation, in
which case they could also be granted employment authorization pendente lite. See
INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208, 243(h). But the IRCA issue cannot be raised before the IJ.
If the IRCA appeal seems more likely to succeed than other forms of relief, the applicant
may be tempted not to prepare fully or present the suspension or political asylum case.
This could be a major procedural mistake in light of the difficulty discussed below in
having a deportation hearing reopened, should the IRCA denial be sustained. However,
from the applicant's perspective, the primary purpose of the deportation hearing under
IRCA is as a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review of the IRCA denial. Few
would surrender to pursue suspension of deportation. And those with strong political
asylum cases would generally be better off first presenting the case affirmatively to the
District Director. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (1989).
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out, the authority to arrest is clear.41 So, even to make the
argument to an article III judge that the INS wrongly denied his
amnesty application, the applicant must risk being confined in
prison throughout the entire court proceeding.
An alien who is found deportable by an IJ has the right to
appeal to the BIA. 42 In an amnesty case, however, there is no
reason to undertake such an appeal, unless collateral remedies
were available and denied. All the applicant wants is a final
order of deportation. In this situation, the decision of the IJ
would be final, and would permit judicial review within the
meaning of INA Section 106.43
The statutory scheme for judicial review of legalization
denials presents substantial hurdles to the applicant and raises
a number of troubling questions. Do illegal aliens have sufficient
due process rights to challenge the unfairness of this system? Is
there a right to judicial review of a denial? If there is no such
right to judicial review, is there a right to be free from proce-
dures like these? The answers to these questions depend to a
large extent upon the intent and power of Congress. Therefore,
as a threshold matter, it is important to ascertain whether Con-
gress intended to create the hall of trap doors and mirrors which
11 INA § 242(a) states: "Pending a determination of deportability of any alien ...
such alien may... be arrested and taken into custody... "See also 8 C.F.R. § 242.2
(1989).
11 See 8 C.F.R. §H 3.1-3.8, 242.21 (1989); see also INA § 236(c); 8 C.F.R. § 236.7
(1989) (appeals of exclusion orders).
43 See INA § 242(b); see also 8 C.F.R. § 3.37, 242.20 (1989). If the applicant has
been denied other relief, however, a significant tactical dilemma emerges. An appeal to
the BIA will be time consuming and may be expensive. The applicant may not have
been granted employment authorization. Moreover, the IRCA administrative record, to
which judicial review is confined, as noted above, will become "stale," leaving the
reviewing court with few options and making further proof, in the event of a remand,
very hard to obtain. Thus, the applicant will have to weigh all the factors and assess
both the relative likelihood of success on the legalization case versus other remedies,
and the relative benefits available from such remedies.
Applicants who had final orders of deportation entered before IRCA relief became
available also face special problems in seeking judicial review of denials. See INA
§ 245A(e)(i), (g)(2)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(a)(2) (1989). If their amnesty applications
are denied, such applicants must consider the prospect of being arrested and deported
within as little as 72 hours. See INA § 242(c)-(e); 8 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1989).
Also, if the applicant attempts to petition a court of appeals for review of the
legalization denial, using the old deportation order as a jurisdictional basis, the court
could dismiss the petition. INA § 106(a)(1) mandates that "a petition for review may be
filed not later than 6 months after the date of the issuance of the final deportation order
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has resulted from IRCA. The next section of this Article thus
examines whether the IRCA labyrinth was intended by Congress
and why that intent might matter.
C. What Did Congress Intend?
IRCA itself does not say that the IJ and BIA cannot decide
legalization appeals. This preclusion was effected by regulation.
Also, IRCA's guarantee of confidentiality and its requirement
of deportation proceedings seem to conflict. It is therefore useful
to ascertain Congress' intent on these two questions. 44 Unfor-
tunately, determining congressional intent is difficult.
IRCA's legislative history. shows the law was a compro-
mise. Though most Congresspersons agreed that the country
had a serious problem, the debate over the solution was in-
tense. 45 Even the name "Immigration Reform and Control Act"
implies two rather different approaches to immigration. One
group primarily sought reform to help make long-term aliens
citizens; the other sought more stringent controls on employers
who hire illegal aliens. 46 Courts generally seek to construe a
statute as a harmonious whole, 47 but this seems impossible with
IRCA.48 The lack of specific attention to the mechanisms of
judicial review and a basic tension between sanctions and am-
44 The importance of Congressional intent to judicial statutory interpretation is a
matter of much debate. Traditionally, the plain meaning of the text is considered of
primary importance. See United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929)("where the language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms
does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be
taken as the final expression of the meaning intended"). This rule generally seems to
have been honored more in the breach, particularly in more recent cases. See Murphy,
Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
"Modern" Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1299, 1301 (1975); see also Comment,
Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive's Interpretation of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 Antidiscrimination Provision: A Circumvention of Constitu-
tionally Prescribed Legislative Procedure, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 1057, 1062 n.27 (1987).
For comprehensive overviews of various theories of statutory interpretation, see Es-
kridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007 (1989);
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20 (1988).
41 See Lungren, supra note 2, at 273-91; Isgro, supra note 4, at 481-83.
46 See Lungren, supra note 2, at 273-91.,
47 See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ("We believe it fundamental
that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole
Act.").
4 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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nesty make it very difficult to discern whether Congress in-
tended to force applicants to undergo the system ultimately
designed.
The legalization program and specifically the confidentiality
provisions were intended to be liberally construed. 49 Yet the
system was also designed to limit access to the courts.50 Con-
gress was well aware that there were large numbers of potential
IRCA applicants.51 The early versions of the bills that ultimately
became IRCA were extremely restrictive as to judicial review. 52
Though Congress rejected the total preclusion of all judicial
review, it wanted to streamline judicial review to some degree.
But it is not clear whether anyone understood the statute to
require an applicant effectively to waive confidentiality and pass
through a threshold deportation proceeding in which she could
not even ask for the relief that necessitated the hearing. It could
49
The Committee intends that the legalization program should be implemented
in a liberal and generous fashion, as has been the historical pattern with other
forms of administrative relief granted by Congress. Such implementation is
necessary to ensure true resolution of the problem and to ensure that the
program will be a one-time-only program . . . . The confidentiality of the
records is meant to assure applicants that the legalization process is serious,
and not a ruse to invite undocumented aliens to come forward only to be snared
by the INS.
H.R, Rep. No. 99-682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, 73 (1986).
50 See Isgro, supra note 4, at 482-83.
51 Id,
11 The Senate version of the bill specifically precluded all judicial review. The Senate
Judiciary Committee explained that:
A legalization program of the magnitude provided for in this section is unique
in history. The program will provide a substantial benefit to large numbers of
persons throughout the United States who are now unknown to government
authorities. A major managerial effort will be required to review the applica-
tions and assure that applicants qualified to be legalized will actually receive
this benefit and that other applicants will not. The Committee is concerned
that efforts will be made, on behalf of many persons who are ineligible for the
legalization program, to delay the final determinations of their applications
It is for the purpose of helping to insure reasonably prompt final
determinations that subsection (f) provides that there will be no judicial review
of a decision or determination made with respect to the legalization program.
Moreover, an alien denied adjustment of status under the legalization program
may not raise a claim concerning such adjustment in any proceeding of the
United States or any State involving the status of such alien ....
S. Rep. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1985).
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be inferred that Congress understood and desired this strange
result.13 Also, the Congressional Record contains references to
the generousness of amnesty, 54 implying that illegal aliens should
be grateful rather than litigious. However, Congress never se-
riously puzzled through the exact workings of the program.
Therefore, given that the provision forbidding the IJ from con-
sidering the merits of the amnesty case is only specified in
regulation, one could argue that this provision was not intended
by Congress.55 Because Congress expressed a preference for the
general idea of a streamlined system of judicial review, however,
a court might conclude that Congress intended to create some-
thing like the current IRCA system.5 6 Therefore, Part II assumes
congressional intent in examining the law and regulations.
53 The House Judiciary Committee, with comments that were ultimately incorpo-
rated into the House Judiciary Report on H.R. 3810 (the bill that became IRCA), seemed
to indicate an understanding that neither the IJ nor the BIA would review an IRCA
denial: "[W]hen the administrative review is exhausted and also yields a negative
decision, and when the applicant is in a deportation proceeding.., the applicant can
appeal a negative decision within the context of judicial review of a deportation order
.... H.R. Rep. No. 115 (I), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1983).
-4 Congress intended a "generous program" to be "implemented in a liberal and
generous fashion." H.R. Rep. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, 72 (1986),
quoted in Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting).
.1 There is little statutory guidance as to judicial review of constitutional questions
arising out of legalization denials. In the hearings on the bills that ultimately became
IRCA, the preclusion of constitutional challenges to various immigration proposals was
hotly debated. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, House ofRepresentatives, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter Hearings].
Courts will not likely infer that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of con-
stitutional claims. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047 (1988).
Even with full consideration, unusual views seem to emerge in this area. "I believe
that the provisions in this bill have struck a delicate balance between advocates in favor
of streamlining the adjudication process and those in favor of providing a full measure
of due process." Hearings, supra note 55, at 278 (testimony of Hon. Peter W. Rodino,
Jr.) (emphasis added). Since the bill never became law, no court was required to
determine the sufficiency of a "partial" measure of due process. See also id. at 949-52
(statement of Maurice A. Roberts, Editor, Interpreter Releases) for a persuasive rebuttal
to the argument that limitations on judicial review will streamline deportation and asylum
proceedings.
16 The review system designed for legalization denials and the extant review systems
for denials of adjustment of status and asylum are similar. Adjustment of status (ad-justment) is a discretionary procedure whereby an alien under temporary or irregular
status may, if eligible for an immigrant visa, apply for permanent residence. The ad-
justment procedure avoids the usual requirement of having to leave and reenter the
United States. See INA § 245. Adjustment originated in the Immigration and Nationality
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II. Congressional Limitations and the Judicial Choice
Between Circumvention and Deference
The immigration problem Congress confronted in 1986 was
extremely complex: how to offer millions of people an unprec-
Act of 1952. Though its eligibility requirements have changed often since 1952, it still
presents numerous financial, practical and legal advantages to the alien, such as:
a. The availability of counsel throughout all proceedings;
b. The right to work during all proceedings;
c. The right to have waivers adjudicated simultaneously with the adjustment ap-
plication; and
d. The avoidance of possible exclusion at the border.
See 3 Immigration L. & Procedure at § 7.7a (1989) [hereinafter Immigration Law].
Congress effected major changes in adjustment in 1986. For example, prior to 1986,
aliens who had entered as non-immigrants and for whom an immigrant visa later became
available were eligible for adjustment even if their permission to remain had expired.
After 1986, such aliens could adjust their status only if they were immediate relatives
of United States citizens.
A similar review procedure also controls asylum cases. Asylum is a discretionary
remedy available to refugees who have a "well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion." INA § 101(a)42.
Affirmative asylum and adjustment applications are made directly to a local INS
District Director. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3 (asylum), 245.2 (adjustment). There is no initial
requirement of conceding deportability. But there is also no guarantee of confidentiality.
Thus, as a practical matter, an application for asylum or adjustment by a deportable
alien entails some risk if the INS denies the application.
The INA does not specifically speak to appeals from adjustment denials. Justice
Department regulations, however, permit no administrative appeal from a denial of
affirmative adjustment applications. If an alien whose application is denied is then served
with an OSC and thus placed in'deportation proceedings, the application for adjustment
may be administratively renewed de novo before the IJ. Courts have used basic ex-
haustion doctrine to determine whether this administrative scheme precludes pre-de-
portation judicial review. Some courts frame the analysis in terms of ripeness, ruling
that an applicant's appeal was premature. As might be expected, the decisions have
been inconsistent. See, e.g., Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (no review
granted, noting a lack of ripeness); Jain v. INS, 612 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1979) (no review
granted), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); Augoustinakis v. INS, 693 F. Supp. 1554
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no review granted, noting a lack of ripeness); Nassan v. INS, 449 F.
Supp. 244 (N.D. I1. 1978) (review granted, citing INA § 279).
These procedures and the IRCA system are similar. Both involve immigration
benefits whose denial cannot be reviewed by an article III judge until after the comple-
tion of deportation proceedings. The differences are subtle, but critical. First, there is
no guarantee of confidentiality in adjustment, asylum or waiver cases, as there is with
IRCA. Therefore, an alien who applies for these benefits knows the risk from the outset.
Second, the deportation phase of an adjustment or asylum case is not merely a hurdle
to be overcome; it offers a meaningful opportunity for review and rehearing.
As noted, many courts see the deportation prerequisite to review in adjustment
cases as an exhaustion question. But a system expressly created by Congress may be
different in theory from one implied by the courts or created by regulations. Where the
IRCA mechanism is held not to have been required by statute, it seems to fall under
the futility exception to exhaustion. See, e.g., Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.
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edented benefit, guarantee confidentiality to induce them to ap-
ply for that benefit, turn the process over to an overburdened
agency 57 and avoid filling the federal courts with thousands of
appeals. In addition to these practical considerations, the draf-
ters of IRCA faced an extraordinarily arcane body of law.
IRCA's concise judicial review provisions incorporate important
aspects of extant immigration law.58 The system looks simple,
and if one does not dig too deeply into the legal firmament, it is
simple. To determine whether IRCA's "simple solution" is
"wrong," it is first useful to consider why most judges, relying
on well-accepted doctrine, would have difficulty in even appre-
ciating the dilemma.
A. An Overview of the Approach of the Judiciaty to
Immigration Cases
Although immigration to America was, for the nation's first
century, largely open and unrestricted, this changed drastically
in the late nineteenth century.5 9 Virtually from the moment when
1988) (exhaustion provision of INA is inapplicable where immigrant cannot rebut con-
fidential information and pursuit of administrative remedies would thus be futile).
57 See Memorandum of former INS General Counsel Raymond M. Momboisse,
reprinted in 66 Interpreter Releases (Federal Publications) No. 41, at 1169-70 (Oct. 23,
1989) ("The INS has not acted as a cohesive entity, but rather more like a feudal state
with each region, district, and sector acting independently.,. . . The incompetency at
all levels of command render[s] many officials liable to disciplinary charges .... Record-
keeping and statistical reporting is fictional and designed more to protect an image of
efficiency and performance than to report the truth.").
58 See supra note 56.
59 It is often argued that this change reflected a movement from "Lockean" liber-
alism to a more instrumentalist, restrictive and racist ideology. See, e.g., Schuck, supra
note 1, at 1-34 (describing "classical" immigration law). A full exploration of the
underlying ideological or metaphysical bases for American immigration law is beyond
the scope of this Article. But it is interesting to note that the early colonists' desires to
emigrate were themselves based upon social and economic factors. The colonists were
eager to populate and exploit the wealth of the new world. This goal did not preclude,
but rather coexisted with, a generalized notion of inalienable human rights which may
concomitantly have justified open borders. See id. at 2. But white European immigrants
in particular sought to suppress slave revolts and to fight Native Americans, goals which
seem to prove that the contradictions which became obvious in the nineteenth century
were already firmly established in the earliest days of the nation. For a comprehensive
overview of the history of United States immigration law, see Staff Report, Select
Comm'n on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National
Interest (1981); T. Aleinikoff & D. Martin, Immigration: Process and Policy 1-59 (1985)
[hereinafter Aleinikoff & Martin]; see generally J. Higham, Strangers in the Land:
Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (1955) (general historical background on
American immigration policies).
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Congress first began to restrict foreign immigration seriously, it
also sought to limit judicial review of immigration cases.60 Be-
fore reviewing the specific history of these limitations, it is
necessary to survey some of the unique principles of American
immigration law.
1. The Exclusion/Deportation Distinction
The basic distinction in American immigration law is that
made between those aliens seeking entry and those whom the
government seeks to remove. Aliens within the United States
who seek a benefit under the immigration laws, usually a change
or regularization of status, occupy a gray zone.
As to the first group, the Constitution has been held largely
irrelevant. In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,61 the
Supreme Court held that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry
is concerned."6 2 This approach has lasted nearly one hundred
years. Although the last decade has witnessed occasional rec-
ognition of the rights of excludable aliens, such recognition has
been challenged and resisted. 63
The doctrine that excludable aliens have virtually no con-
stitutional rights derives from the idea that congressional power
to control immigration is rooted in the concept of sovereignty. 64
In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion
Case),65 Justice Field wrote, "[tlhe power of exclusion of for-
eigners [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the govern-
ment of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers
w See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
61 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
62 Id. at 544, quoted in Schuck, supra note 1, at 19 n.93. See generally id. at 18-21
(extra-constitutional status of exclusion).
6. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)
(federal question jurisdiction resides in district court where complaint alleges that pro-
cedures used violated alien's constitutional rights), questioned in Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957 ( 1th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (excludable aliens have no constitutional rights and
may be denied admission on grounds that would otherwise be impermissible), aff'd,
472 U.S. 846 (1985); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(granting of procedural rights to excludable aliens on parole from administrative deten-
tion), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (parole is part of admission).
61 See Schuck, supra note 1, at 1-8.
65 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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delegated by the Constitution .... ",66 Justice Field justified this
holding as follows:
To preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest
duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly
all other considerations are to be subordinated. It mat-
ters not in what form such aggression and encroach-
ment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in
its national character or from vast hordes of its people
crowding in upon us. 67
The plaintiff in the Chinese Exclusion Case apparently claimed
no constitutional rights. 68 Nevertheless, over time, the doctrine
that Congress possesses a plenary power to control external
immigration despite the absence of specific constitutional au-
thorization for this power69 has expanded into the doctrine that,
for aliens seeking admission for the first time, the power is not
subject to any constitutional limitations at all. 70
The first Supreme Court case to address the question of the
source of the government's power to deport aliens was Fong
Yue Ting v. United States.71 In that case, the petitioner chal-
lenged an act passed in 189272 that required all Chinese laborers
to obtain a "certificate of residence." An alien found without a
6Id. at 609.
67 Id. at 606.
68 See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 858 (1987).
69 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936)(foreign affairs power held to derive from the nature of independence). See also Alei-
nikoff & Martin, supra note 59, at 15 (discussing how Curtiss-Wright encompasses the
immigration power).
70 Although the Supreme Court has never fully explored the outer limits of this
doctrine, it appears to underlie a number of important decisions. See, e.g., Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (returning resident alien has some due process rights in
exclusion proceedings, as distinguished from first time arrivals, who have no constitu-
tional rights); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Attorney General need offer
only a facially legitimate and bona fide reason to exclude alien on basis of likely content
of speech); see also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (aliens
seeking admission held to have no constitutional rights), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
The doctrine has been extensively criticized, however. See Developments, supra note
1, at 1339-48.
71 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
72 Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943).
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certificate would be arrested and deported unless he could show
that he was a resident at the time the Act was passed. But the
latter requirement could only be proved "by at least one credible
white witness."' 73 The petitioners in Fong Yue Ting could not
produce white witnesses and were therefore held to be
deportable.
In considering the constitutional challenges, the Court be-
gan by asserting that "the right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners ... rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their en-
trance into the country. '74 Viewing the matter as essentially a
political question, the Court declined to examine closely the
government's deportation mechanism. 75
2. The Procedures of Deportation
Although Fong Yue Ting would seem to end all judicial
review of deportation matters, the procedures of deportation
have been scrutinized more closely by the judiciary than the
substance. 76 In Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant
Case),77 the Court drew a distinction that remains in the law
today:
[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be under-
stood as holding, that administrative officers, when
executing the provisions of a statute involving the lib-
erty of persons, may disregard the fundamental prin-
71 Id. at 26.
7 Fong Due Ting, 149 U.S. at 707.
71 Justice Field, who had authored the Chinese Exclusion Case, dissented in Fong
Yte Ting on the grounds that the petitioners in Fong Yue Ting were lawful residents of
the United States, protected by the Constitution, and that the 1892 Act imposed pun-
ishment without due process of law and violated the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth
amendments.
76 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (Court upheld deportation
of legal resident alien because of membership in the Communist party even though
membership had terminated before Congress made it a ground for deportation).
7 189 U.S. 86 (1903). For an eloquent explanation of why this development was
necessary, see Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953).
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ciples that inhere in "due process of law" as understood
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 78
Thus, aliens in deportation proceedings have a constitutional
right to a fundamentally fair hearing. 79 The Supreme Court,
however, has indicated that some of the components of funda-
mental fairness could depend upon whether deportation is
viewed as a quasi-criminal or civil proceeding. s°
Courts have declined to invoke procedural due process in
exclusion hearings to the same degree as in deportation hear-
ings. 81 Exclusion cases involve both initial applicants for admis-
sion and returning resident aliens.8 2 The Court has seen this
distinction as crucial to the procedural rights available to the
alien: "[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins
to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his consti-
tutional status changes accordingly. '83
This approach combines two distinct factors: long term
residence in the United States and legal status. But legality
makes little sense as a prerequisite for procedural due process.
All aliens in deportation are accused of being illegal. The
grounds of deportation range from defects in the manner of
78 The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100. Ms. Yamataya's breakthrough
was of little help to her. The Court went on to hold that the fact that she apparently did
not understand a word of the proceedings was no violation of due process.
79 See Aquilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050 (1976). This concept probably includes a right to an adequate translation. See
Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982). It
also probably requires timely notice of charges, opportunity to be heard and to produce
evidence and witnesses, opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, the right to have the
decision based on the evidence and the right to some review. See Immigration Law,
supra note 56, at § 5.5. The statute provides for a number of these protections specifically
at INA § 242(b). The extent to which these are all required by due process has rever
been determined by the Supreme Court, however. Aliens in exclusion hearings'have
substantially fewer procedural rights. See Immigration Law, supra note 56, at § 3.20(d).
80 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (deportation is a civil pro-
ceeding and the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply, except in unusual
circumstances, though the basic right to a fair hearing under the fifth amendment
remains).
SI See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (returning resident alien held
entitled to due process in exclusion hearing); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)
(innocent, casual and brief departure from United States entitles resident alien to greater
procedural protections and does not justify exclusion hearing upon return).
n See INA §§ 235, 236.
83 See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.
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initial entry84 to crimes committed many years later.85 To base
procedural due process on the legality of an alien's status would
require a preliminary hearing to determine the process due at
the deportation hearing. A more logical view is that procedural
rights should be based upon an alien's stake in the community86
or community ties. 87 Either of these approaches would certainly
help IRCA applicants, who have lived in the United States for
many years.
3. Deference to the Legislature
In addition to basing the scope of aliens' due process rights
on technical immigration status, courts have followed a tradition
of extreme deference in immigration cases. Given the lack of
clear lines between substantive and procedural issues in admis-
sion, benefits and deportation cases,88 the deference principle is
often dispositive. As one commentator put it: "In the canon of
classical immigration law, judges should be seen-if absolutely
necessary-but not heard. '89
The typical formulation of judicial deference in the immi-
gration context is as follows: "'over no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over'
the admission of aliens . . . . Our cases 'have long recognized
the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments
[which are] largely immune from judicial control.' 9 Deference
1 See INA § 241(a)(1).
85 See INA § 241(a)(4).
8 See Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political
Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 165 (1983).
17 See Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to
Martin, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237 (1983).
01 See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
89 Schuck, supra note 1, at 14. See generally id. at 18-21.
90 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 210 (1953); see e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Lem Moon
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
Recent Supreme Court "decisions have not departed from this long-established
rule." Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101
n.21 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976)).
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is invoked in a wide range of situations. 91 Professor Peter Schuck
speculates that such deference is largely based upon a reification
of sovereignty as a source of governmental power, making ex-
pansion of rights by accretion more difficult. 92 Thus, even if a
judge seriously entertains an immigration question, she will have
to contend immediately with "not merely 'a page of history'
.. but a whole volume. '93 But reification of sovereignty does
not necessarily exclude the judiciary from participating in defin-
ing the sovereign power.94 Moreover, reification does not explain
the continuing reliance on peculiar precedents that were ex-
pressly racist, like the Chinese Exclusion Case, or that have
been otherwise extensively criticized. 95 If Professor Schuck's
optimism about the trend in this area of law proves correct, it
will not necessarily be because courts cease to rely on sover-
eignty as a foundational principle. Rather, it will be because
other principles, such as basic procedural human rights, will
assume more importance. 96
B. A Brief History of Limitations on Judicial Review of
Immigration Cases
Against the backdrop of extreme judicial deference and
conflicting social, economic and ideological forces, Congress
has often sought to limit judicial review of immigration matters.
These limitations reflect two contradictory concerns: the asser-
91 See, e.g., Smith v. INS, 684 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Mass. 1988) (rejecting due process
and equal protection challenge to aspect of Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
which would require alien who had married citizen to leave the United States for two
years before obtaining permanent residence).
92 See Schuck, supra note 1, at 18-21.
91 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (citation omitted).
94 See Schuck, supra note 1, at 20.
9- See id. at 87-89.
96 There are, of course, positive reasons for judicial deference in some areas of
immigration law. For example, substantive and political policy choices regulating the
admission of aliens into the United States are generally not an appropriate subject for
judicial review. But where those policy choices directly impact positive constitutional
rights of citizens or resident aliens, courts should not reflexively defer to the political
branches. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (certain INS
border search practices considered subject to the fourth amendment). See also United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Similarly, as recognized by the Court in
the Japanese Immigrant Case, procedural unfairness should generally be reviewed by
the judiciary.
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tion by the legislature of largely unreviewable sovereign power
and a concern that the courts not be overburdened by immigra-
tion cases. The concern of Congress with litigation seems some-
what surprising given that the courts themselves have so fre-
quently deferred to the legislative and executive branches in
immigration cases. A review of the history of congressional
actions to limit review in immigration cases reveals a complex
dialogue about which the best that can be said is that "[t]he best
laid schemes o' Mice an' Men, Gang aft agley." 97
1. From Habeas Corpus to the APA
As early as 1891, administrative decisions in immigration
cases were defined by Congress as "final. ' 98 With the exception
of the infamous Chinese Exclusion Laws, which provided for
determinations by commissioners and district courts, 99 most im-
migration decisions were, at least until the passage of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952, considered to be immune
from all but habeas corpus review.1t0 Habeas review was not,
however, available until the alien was physically taken into
custody.' 0' Thus, even though habeas review could provide
' R. Burns, "To a Mouse," in The Kilmarnock Poems (Poems Chiefly in Scottish
Dialect, 1786) (1985), "Agley" means "awry," according to the editor.
93 See Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085 ("[a]ll decisions
made by the inspection officers ... shall be final unless appeal be taken to the [S]ecretary
of [I]mmigration, whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the
Treasury."). See also Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 233-35 (1952) (habeas corpus
is the only means for challenging a deportation order).
9 See An Act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, ch. 126,
§ 12, 22 Stat. 58, 61 (1882) (amended 1884, 1888, 1892).
1O See Note, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress
and the Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 760 (1962). The passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982), in 1934 raised hopes that aliens might be able to challenge
immigration decisions without first being imprisoned. In Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325
(1939), the Supreme Court held that a person threatened with deportation proceedings
could bring a district court action under the Declaratory Judgment Act to determine her
claim to citizenship. See also McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 169 (1950) ("Where
an official's authority to act depends upon the status of the person affected, in this case
eligibility for citizenship, that status, when in dispute, may be determined by a declar-
atory judgment proceeding after the exhaustion of administrative remedies."). But see
Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 233-35 (upholding the exclusivity of habeas corpus jurisdiction to
all cases arising under the Immigration Act of 1917 that involved outstanding orders of
deportation and limiting Elg and Kristensen to claims of citizenship).
101 Imprisonment is no longer necessarily a jurisdictional prerequisite for habeas
corpus review in immigration cases. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345
(1973) (release on own recognizance); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (par-
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close scrutiny of deportation procedures, 02 the custody require-
ment limited its availability.
The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)03 in 1946 raised questions about the extent to which
"final" meant "really final" under the immigration laws. In Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 04 the Supreme Court extended the APA
and its judicial review mechanism to deportation proceedings,
holding that immigration officers who also performed investi-
gative and prosecutorial functions could not fairly act as impar-
tial adjudicators. The decision seemed to base the right to an
impartial hearing in the Constitution as well as the APA.'05
Congress, however, immediately responded by passing a law
that specifically exempted exclusion and deportation proceed-
ings from the relevant provisions of the APA.106 One year later,
that provision was repealed by the comprehensive Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).10 7 The INA permitted a
hearing officer to act as both prosecutor and hearing officer,
though she may not hear cases she investigated. In addition,
the INA stated that the deportation procedure it created was to
be "sole and exclusive."' 08 These provisions were upheld by the
Supreme Court in Marcello v. Bonds, 0 9 but the constitutional
question was finessed. 110
ole); United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Director, 634 F.2d 964 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981) (outstanding order of deportation held valid basis for habeas
corpus jurisdiction even though alien not in custody).
102 See, e.g., Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (alien entering and
claiming citizenship entitled to fair hearing before deportation; habeas corpus review
available to determine whether hearing was sufficient); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japa-
nese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (Court used habeas corpus jurisdiction to
review the fairness of the deportation hearing); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651 (1892) (alien detained upon entry entitled to writ of habeas corpus; issue is
whether government had "sufficient" reason to detain, not whether arrest and detention
were flawed).
103 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
,04 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
105 See id. at 50 ("When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one.").
106 See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951, ch. 1052, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048
(1950).
107 Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1557 (1988).
108 INA § 242(b).
Mo 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
11 See Schuck, supra note I at 32-34, for a strong critique of the Court's reasoning
in Marcello (discussing how the Court ignored the question of how Wong Yang Sung's
constitutional fair hearing requirement could be overruled by Congress).
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Notwithstanding its traditional reticence to involve the ju-
diciary in immigration matters, the Supreme Court liberally con-
strued the relationship between the APA and the INA. In
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,"I the Court held that deportation or-
ders entered under the 1952 Act were reviewable under the
rubric of the APA. Thus, beginning in 1956, the validity of
deportation orders could be tested without the alien going to jail
first.
2. Section 106
Judicial review of immigration cases based primarily on the
APA was to last less than five years. In 1961, responding to the
perception that aliens and their attorneys were abusing the ju-
dicial system with repetitious and unjustified delaying tactics,112
Congress passed and the President signed an amendment to the
INA which specified, for the first time, a systematic approach
to review of deportation orders. 13
Section 106 of the INA mandated:
1. That judicial review of "final" deportation orders could
only be in the courts of appeals;
2. That all administrative remedies available "as of right"
be exhausted;
3. That judicial review be based "solely upon the admin-
istrative record upon which the deportation order is based" and
that administrative findings of fact, if supported by "reasonable,
substantial and probative evidence" shall be conclusive;
4. That habeas corpus would again be the exclusive method
of review of exclusion cases.
In enacting Section 106, Congress intended to limit access
to the district courts in deportation matters, to avoid multiple
M 349 U.S. 48 (1955). See also Brownell v. Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) (exclusion
orders could be similarly reviewed). These cases applied the APA only because the
INA was deemed silent as to the particular types of cases presented. Thus, to this day,
the APA applies to review of immigration matters only where review is not specifically
precluded or defined in the immigration laws.
12 See Note, supra note 100, at 760 n.4 ("This feeling is reflected on virtually every
page of H.R. Rep. No. 565.").
113 Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 651, 660-62, INA § 106
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988)).
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layers of appellate review and to require as much deference as
possible to the INS hearing procedures. In spite of the clear
congressional intent to streamline and simplify procedures, how-
ever, Section 106 has itself spawned a great deal of litigation.
One of the areas of greatest difficulty has involved the
definition of the statutory term "final order of deportation." ' 4
In Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the petitioner
applied for a suspension of his deportation hearing. When the
application was denied, he appealed to the BIA, which also
denied relief. He then commenced an action in district court,
but the action was dismissed on the ground that Section 106
required review in a court of appeals. The Second Circuit, how-
ever, then dismissed his petition, holding that Section 106 did
not apply to applications for discretionary relief. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that "all determinations made during
and incident to the administrative proceeding" were included
within Section 106.115
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,116 the Court held that jurisdiction to review the denial
of a stay of deportation, which order had not been entered
during the deportation proceeding itself, was not covered by
Section 106 and could therefore be reviewed by the district
court. Thus, after Foti and Cheng Fan Kwok there appeared to
be a bright line test for Section 106: orders entered during
deportation proceedings, and deportation orders themselves,
could be challenged only in the courts of appeals. All other
issues, even if integrally related to the deportation question," 7
were left for the district courts. In effect, the order the INS
chose to enter determined where the petitioner could seek
review.
"4 Compare Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963) (denial of suspension of deportation
is reviewable as part of a final order) and Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (denial
of motion to reopen held reviewable by court of appeals) with Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS,
392 U.S. 206 (1968) (denial of stay of deportation by District Director pending adjustment
application not part of final order; § 106(a) held to embrace only those determinations
made during deportation proceedings).
115 Foti, 375 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).
116 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
"7 See, e.g., Kavasji v. INS, 675 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1982) (denial by District Director
of application for transfer of schools and extension of stay held to be outside the ambit
of § 106 even though result was deportation).
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Since Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,"8
the question has involved the meaning of the word "contingent"
as well as that of the word "final." In Chadha, the Supreme
Court was asked by both the alien and the Justice Department
to consider whether a constitutional challenge to a one-House
legislative veto of a suspension of deportation was reviewable
under Section 106. To address the constitutional question, as
both Chadha and the Justice Department requested, the Court
expanded the jurisdictional test as follows: "[T]he term final
orders in [Section] 106(a) includes all matters on which the
validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those
determinations made at the hearing.'" 9
The courts of appeals have continued to wrestle with the
definitional conundrum of Section 106.120 As a matter of policy,
the Chadha formulation is puzzling. Opening the courts of ap-
peals to the wide variety of immigration matters upon which an
order may be contingent does not serve the policy of reducing
the burden upon the federal courts. When Congress placed the
IRCA judicial review mechanism within the framework of Sec-
tion 106, it seems to have adopted the Chadha view of a final
order. A final order of deportation is contingent upon the legal-
ization application. Moreover, the notion that federal court ju-
risdiction may be completely dependent upon administrative
practice, argued to be anomalous in Cheng Fan Kwok, is acutely
problematic with IRCA, where the deportation component of
the administrative process is completely severed from the le-
galization case. It appears that some of the procedural difficul-
ties with IRCA actually derive from Section 106 and from the
approaches taken by the judiciary in construing its terms.
In addition, district courts have used the exhaustion of
remedies principle to deny review in a variety of settings.' 2 1 The
district court jurisdictional statutes do not explicitly require
I's 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
19 Id. at 938 (citation omitted).
120 See, e.g., Mohammadi-Motlagh v. INS, 727 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1984) (court of
appeals has no jurisdiction to determine whether INS properly denied an alien permis-
sion to transfer schools; denial was not a determination on which the final order of
deportation was contingent).
"I See, e.g., Kashani v. Nelson, 793 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.) (upholding district court
ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to review administrative denial of asylum request), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1006 (1986).
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exhaustion, 22 as do Section 106 and IRCA, and no immigration
statute prior to IRCA has ever required exhaustion of a com-
pletely futile procedure. Thus, no court has considered the va-
lidity of this mechanism. Nevertheless, courts have declined to
require exhaustion where the procedures that the alien is forced
to undergo are themselves alleged to be unconstitutional. This
argument can be made about the IRCA deportation requirement.
The most famous case involving allegedly unconstitutional
immigration procedures is Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith ,123
a class action involving over 4000 Haitian applicants for asylum.
The applicants alleged that the INS had carefully orchestrated
a program to deny them their statutory and constitutional rights.
In holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear com-
plaints of a "pattern and practice" by immigration officials to
violate applicants' constitutional rights, the court stated:
Although a court of appeals may have sole jurisdiction
to review alleged procedural irregularities in an indi-
122 The most common basis for district court jurisdiction in immigration cases is
INA § 279, providing that "[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdic-
tion of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of this
subchapter."
The term "this subchapter" refers to title II of the Act governing most immigration
matters. Title I ("General") includes INA §§ 101-106, which, in addition to the jurisdic-
tional matters discussed in this Article, contain definitions and powers of the Attorney
General, the INS, and the Secretary of State. See id. at 99 1101-1106. Title II governs
Immigration. See id. at 99 1151-1365. Title III governs Nationality and Naturalization;
see id. at 99 1401-1503; title IV, refugee assistance; see id. at §§ 1521-1525.
To obtain jurisdiction under § 279, plaintiffs must show that the claim arises under
title II and is not subject to preclusion of review under statutes such as § 106. See, e.g.,
Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley, 459 F. Supp. 762, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court lacked jurisdic-
tion to hear appeal of denial of pre-1980 asylum claim because statutory basis of claim
was INA § 279). Typically, appellants also invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), which states:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. V 1987), is also often used. See Navarro v. INS, 574 F.2d 379
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978).
Finally, the writ of habeas corpus remains available in the district courts pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982). Since the passage of § 106, actual physical custody is not
necessarily a jurisdictional prerequisite to habeas corpus relief. See Flores v. INS, 524
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex.rel. Pon v. Esperdy, 296 F. Supp. 726
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Garcia v. Smith, 674 F.2d 838, 840 n.1 (11th Cir.) (upholding
habeas corpus review of asylum claim), modified on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1327
(1982).
M2 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). See also Salehi v. INS, 796 F.2d 1286,
1290-91 (10th Cir. 1986) (allowing due process claim which is not a direct attack on
deportation order).
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vidual deportation hearing to the extent these irregu-
larities may provide a basis for reversing an individual
deportation order, that is not to say that a program,
pattern or scheme by immigration officials to violate
the constitutional rights of aliens is not a separate mat-
ter subject to examination by a district court. 124
The court further noted that exhaustion is not a jurisdictional
requirement, but a matter of judicial discretion. Alhough the
court allowed the action to proceed, 125 it warned that its holding
was "not to be construed as permitting a constitutional challenge
in the district court based on a procedural ruling in a deportation
proceeding with which an alien is dissatisfied. We refuse to
condone any such end-run around the administrative
process."126
Although the Fifth Circuit was clear about the limits of its
Haitian Refugee Center approach to immigration cases, both
Congress and other circuits have expressed concern about its
implications. Participants at hearings regarding IRCA's precur-
sors extensively discussed the case and frequently expressed
their desire to eliminate even this small loophole in the exhaus-
tion requirement. 27
124 Haitian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1033.
2s Id. at 1034. The court discussed the factors it considered in determining whether
judicial review was appropriate:
I) allowing the agency to develop a more complete factual record;
2) permitting the exercise of agency discretion and expertise on issues
requiring this;
3) preventing deliberate disregard and circumvention of established
agency procedures; and
4) enhancing judicial efficiency and eliminating the need for judicial vin-
dication of the rights by giving the agency the first opportunity to correct any
error.
676 F.2d at 1034 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969), and
Ecology Center of Louisiana, Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860, 866 (5th Cir. 1975)).
226 676 F.2d at 1033. Judge Posner recently echoed this warning in a concurring
opinion in Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1479 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(upholding judicial review of a due process challenge to procedures of the Veteran's
Administration), when he expressed concern that "federal courts [will] be inundated
with run-of-the-mine procedural challenges dressed up as constitutional claims." Id. at
1483 (Posner, J., concurring). Posner believes that such challenges can be preempted
by vigorously enforcing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (sanctions upon persons who file frivolous
suits). See id. at 1483 (Posner, J., concurring).
127 See Hearings, supra note 55. The range of opinions on this matter was broad.
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Moreover, in Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh,'28 the District of
Columbia Circuit referred to Haitian Refugee Center as "a gap-
ing hole in the middle of the INS's defensive line. 12 9 Ayuda
considered the question whether IRCA precluded judicial re-
view of INS rulemaking regarding eligibility for amnesty. Four
organizations that counsel aliens and five individual aliens sued
in federal court claiming that the INS based its regulation defin-
ing the phrase "unlawful status known to the Government" 30
on an impermissible interpretation of the statute.' 31 The court
of appeals first considered IRCA's standard of review, noting
that it is "about as restrictive as the Congress can fashion."'32
The court speculated that "even legal questions concerning the
interpretation of IRCA are reviewable only under the abuse of
discretion standard,' '1 33 though it seemed somewhat uncomfort-
able with this conclusion.134
The court then concluded that broad challenges to INS
policy and rulemaking are not permitted under IRCA. The court
stated that IRCA prohibited judicial review "of a determination
respecting an application,"' 135 explaining that "if anything, the
legislative history suggests that Congress, rather than consid-
ering such extensive judicial monitoring of the legalization pro-
Both Maurice Roberts, editor of Interpreter Releases, and John Shattuck of the ACLU
questioned the basic assumption that judicial review was responsible for the backlog in
asylum cases, blaming instead the INS itself. See id. at 952 (statement of Maurice
Roberts); id. at 1071 (statement of John H.F. Shattuck) (urging that existing rights to
judicial review be maintained, including district court review of allegations similar to
those in Haitian Refugee Center). Otis L. Graham, of the Federation for American
Immigration Reform ("FAIR"), argued that the House bill provided for "interminable
appeals" and was "a prescription for disaster." Id. at 733. Similarly, Rep. James H.
Scheuer of New York wondered whether the legal system could handle "the load of 1
million or more people who can be expected ... each entitled to long, detailed and
expensive constitutional processes?" Id. at 1020. Many witnesses expressed concern
about limitations on review of pattern and practice cases. See, e.g., id. at 1259 (statement
of Walter E. Fauntroy).
128 80 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
129 Id. at 1336.
130 IRCA grants amnesty to aliens who legally entered the United States before
January 1, 1982, but whose authorized stay expired before that date or whose unlawful
status was "known to the Government" by that date. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B)
(1988).
13 See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 660-66 (D.D.C. 1988).
132 Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1329 (citations omitted).
133 Id.
134 See id. at 1329-30 n.2.
135 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(1) (1988).
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gram, only grudgingly provided any judicial review even in the
context of deportation orders.' ' 36 Thus, Ayuda indicates an ex-
treme judicial deference to INS actions under IRCA. But the
case leaves important questions unanswered. The court does
not carefully consider constitutional claims which, by their very
nature, cannot be deferred under Section 106. Even assuming
the Ayuda holding is correct, IRCA might still permit judicial
review of claims that the procedure itself is unconstitutional.
The policy behind both Section 106 and IRCA, as noted by
the dissent in Ayuda, was "to foreclose aliens from flooding the
courts with suits seeking premature review of individual appli-
cations."'' 37 The policy, however, does not mean that all consti-
tutional challenges are implicitly barred. 138 Moreover, the court
in Ayuda failed to consider IRCA's mechanisms, with both
majority and dissent simply taking for granted that denied ap-
plicants would complete deportation proceedings and seek re-
view afterward. 139
136 880 F.2d at 1334. The court's linguistic analysis, however, is questionable. See
id. at 1359 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
The court opined that Haitian Refugee Center and its progeny were inconsistent
with Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984), a challenge to a ruling issued by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that precluded payment under Medicare for a
particular surgical procedure. The Supreme Court refused to permit such challenges,
holding that Ringer was "clearly seeking to establish a right to future payments." Id. at
621. The Ayuda court, however, noted that, unlike Haitian Refugee Center, Ringer did
not present a constitutional claim. See Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1336.
The court also cited with disapproval those cases where district courts had applied
the Haitian Refugee Center approach to IRCA. See id. at 1337. See infra note 140 for
a discussion of these cases. The court stated its opinion of IRCA as follows:
We think that whatever the proper interpretation of section 106 as it relates to
"final orders of deportation," IRCA's judicial review provisions, although em-
ploying the section 106 machinery, have a broader preclusive effect. It is
arguable, for example, that certain INS actions other than those under IRCA
taken before initiation of deportation proceedings are reviewable in the district
court under APA standards, despite the exclusivity provision of section 106
.... IRCA, however, provides for an alien to seek review of a denial of
legalization only in the context of a deportation proceeding.
Id. at 1337-38 (citations omitted); but see id. at 1357 (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority's "flamboyant" reading of § 1255a(f)).
"17 Id. at 1354 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
Il See Webster v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2053 (1988) ("Where Congress intends to
preclude review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.") (citing
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974)).
139 See Ayuda, 880 F.2d at 1339, 1354.
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No litigant has yet challenged the constitutionality of an
IRCA denial or of the mandatory deportation proceeding. The
reasons for this absence of constitutional challenges are as
follows:
1. Relatively few cases have been finally denied by the
LAU; in fact, the INS has generally been liberal in its deter-
minations of the facts of legalization cases;
2. The traditions of sovereign power and judicial deference
present imposing obstacles to such challenges; and
3. Alternatives are readily available. A number of cases,
for example, have already successfully challenged INS practices
and procedures in IRCA cases, though never the statute itself.140
Notwithstanding Ayuda, the constitutional questions raised
by IRCA will inevitably have to be addressed. Characterization
of claims as constitutional is difficult in the immigration context
140 These collateral actions have arisen from a wide variety of situations. The first
cases involved applicants with prior orders of deportation who claimed prima facie
eligibility for legalization, but who were denied stays of deportation. Jurisdiction in
cases of this type seems most properly based upon a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Gregg, 813 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1987) (denying petition of Cuban parolee
incarcerated during resolution of legalization case); Dor v. INS, 697 F. Supp. 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying challenge to deportation proceedings due to failure to exhaust
administrative remedies); Gutierrez v. Ilchert, 682 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (pe-
tition conditionally granted regarding detention upon reentry from three week visit to
Mexico); Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (upholding challenge
to deportation order based on alleged INS misinterpretation of "known to the Govern-
ment"); Bailey v. Brooks, 688 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (petition for habeas
corpus granted regarding detention upon reentry from brief trip to Canada).
In cases that did not involve immediate threats of imprisonment or deportation,
applicants have generally sought relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Although such cases have involved a wide variety
of specific challenges to INS actions, all were specifically distinguished from reviews
of denials. For a case in which plaintiffs challenged the 30 day rule of 8 C.F.R.
§ 245a.2(a)(2)(i) (1989), see Doe v. Nelson, 703 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Il. 1988). The
government argued, inter alia, that the suit was barred by INA § 245A(f)(2). The court,
noting that plaintiffs challenged the methods of INS and not the specific denial, allowed
the cause of action to go forward. Doe, 703 F. Supp. at 721 (quoting Marozsan v. United
States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1472 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)). See also Haitian Refugee Center,
Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1555 (1988); Vargas v.
Meese, 682 F. Supp. 591 (D.D.C. 1987).
Cases which can be certified as class actions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are
less likely to be viewed as attempts to circumvent INA § 245A(f). See LULAC v. INS,
No. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal. 1988); Bamondi v. INS, No. 88-1410-KG (S.D. Cal. 1988);
Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 664 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Cal. 1987). But see
Doe, 703 F. Supp. at 721 ("The INS cannot seriously argue that a pattern of constitu-
tional violations becomes intolerable only once a threshold number of people are
victimized.").
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because courts have tended to make rights contingent on tech-
nical status. The next section of this Article explains how tra-
ditional immigration doctrine would likely be applied to this
unique statute.
C. The Probable Judicial Approach to the Constitutionality of
IRCA Under Traditional Immigration Law
As noted in Section A, the extent of aliens' rights, and the
degree of judicial involvement in determining those rights, have
traditionally depended upon the context in which the cases have
arisen. Admission cases evoke minimal scrutiny and involve
almost no recognized rights. At the other extreme, the judiciary
becomes substantially involved with the procedures of depor-
tation. Such threshold classification is largely dispositive of the
outcome of the legal analysis in immigration cases. Although
IRCA applies only to aliens already in the United States, it does
not implicate the procedures of deportation.141 Courts may view
the statute as providing a benefit, deeming it, in immigration
terms, a quasi-admission case.
To illustrate how this works in practice, two well-known
examples of constitutional challenges to immigration laws,
which encompass the different ways courts might approach
IRCA, should be compared:
1. Challenges to substantive classifications such as the de-
nial of benefits to the illegitimate children of permanent resident
or citizen fathers, based upon due process or equal protection
grounds; 4 2 and
2. Challenges to Section 5 of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986 (IMFA).143
M One could argue, however, that the statute involves procedures by prohibiting
the introduction of relevant evidence. But the initial question of whether Congress had
the power to force the proceeding remains.
"I See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (rejecting argument that provision denying
special immigration status to illegitimate children of citizen fathers while granting status
to children of citizen mothers was violation of due process, equal protection, and ninth
amendment). I would also include within this rubric challenges based upon arguably
restrictive definitions of families. See, e.g., INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (rejecting
argument that alien's relationship with nieces was functional equivalent of parent-child
relationship for preferential status purposes).
143 INA §§ 204(h), 245(e). IMFA was a companion piece of legislation to IRCA. Its
substantive provisions are discussed infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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Because of the latitude given Congress in admission deci-
sions and the tradition of judicial deference, challenges to sub-
stantive classifications have been uniformly unsuccessful.44 Due
process and equal protection considerations are too contingent
upon balancing of government interests to overcome the tradi-
tion in this context. To define IRCA as an admission statute
would virtually guarantee that its judicial review provisions
would be upheld. 145
The IMFA cases' 46 are perhaps the best harbingers of future
judicial rulings under IRCA. Section 5 of IMFA provides that
any alien who marries a citizen during deportation proceedings
must leave the United States and stay abroad for two years
before her spouse can file a petition to obtain permanent resi-
dency for her. This foreign residency requirement, based upon
a congressional perception of frequent fraud in this context, 147
applies to all marriages which take place after deportation pro-
'44 See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787 (Court declines to review substantive policy
choices by Congress to determine which aliens may enter the United States). The mere
fact that IRCA largely affects people already within the United States is also unlikely,
as a practical matter, to sway courts from this paradigm. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617
F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (denying equal protection
challenge to special requirements imposed on Iranian students). An example of a more
vigorous invocation of due process is Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976)
(distinction between aliens who have left and returned, and those who never left U.S.
held impermissible even under minimum scrutiny in context of statutory remedy). One
should note, though, that Francis did not hold the statute unconstitutional on its face,
but held it unconstitutional as applied by the agency.
145 A related class of cases has been based on the alleged violation by the govern-
ment of some other, more specific constitutional provision. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983), for example, involved separation of powers, and both the Justice Department
and the plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutional. The first amendment has
also formed the basis for a variety of challenges, with only limited success. See, e.g.,
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (challenge
to scope of executive authority to deny visa requests to aliens invited to speak in the
United States as a violation of the first amendment; remanded to district court for
hearing on whether exclusion may be based only on aliens' anticipated activities in the
United States).
146 See Almario v. Attorney General, 872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989) (IMFA held
supported by facially legitimate and bona fide reason); Escobar v. INS, 700 F. Supp.
609 (D.D.C. 1988) (challenge to IMFA based upon equal protection and due process
rejected); Anetekhai v. INS, 685 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd, 876 F.2d 1218
(5th Cir. 1989) (challenge to IMFA based on equal protection, due process, first, ninth
and tenth amendments rejected); Smith v. INS, 684 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Mass. 1988)
(challenge to IMFA based upon equal protection and due process rejected). But see
Manwani v. United States Dep't of Justice, 1988 WL 149145 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (denial
of defendant's motion to dismiss in IMFA challenge).
147 See Santana, The Proverbial Catch 22: The Unconstitutionality of Section Five
of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of.1986, 25 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
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ceedings have been commenced. Prior to IMFA such marriages
often resulted in the termination of deportation proceedings and
the adjustment of status of the alien spouse.
In challenging Section 5, an attractive litigation strategy is
to avoid characterizing the case as an attack upon the classifi-
cation scheme itself to avoid confronting the principle of ple-
nary, virtually unreviewable congressional power. One could
distinguish classification cases by arguing that the INA itself
provided the benefit, but that the subsequent burden created by
IMFA was impermissibly based upon marriage. One court has
even gone so far as to reject this distinction by holding that
IMFA needs only to be supported by a "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason.' ' 48 The argument that IMFA burdens aliens
who are in the United States was also rejected. 49
One can also make the following equal protection and due
process arguments:150
1. IMFA impermissibly burdens the marital relationship;
2. IMFA violates equal protection by classifying persons
based upon marriage;
3. IMFA deprives plaintiffs of a liberty interest in marriage
without due process of law; and
4. IMFA creates an invalid, irrebuttable legislative pre-
sumption, which violates due process.
A full analysis of these arguments is beyond the scope of
this Article. But because the equal protection and due process
considerations arise under IRCA, they merit some limited
consideration.
1. Equal Protection
The equal protection argument regarding IMFA is essen-
tially that classifications that burden the exercise of a funda-
mental right such as marriage must pass "strict scrutiny. 1 51
48 Ahnario, 872 F.2d at 151.
149 See id. at 152. This argument would be even more difficult to make in relation
to IRCA, where all the aliens involved were illegal.
1.1 See, e.g., id.; Smith, 684 F. Supp. 1113.
1-1 The equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amendment apply to the
federal government through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974).
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However, the plenary power of Congress has been held to limit
the constitutional protection afforded the marital relationship. 152
As the court in Smith wrote, "[t]he role of the courts in analyzing
an equal protection challenge to a federal immigration statute is
limited to determining whether the statute at issue is conceivably
related to the achievement of a federal interest.' 1 53 IMFA was
held to meet this minimal standard.
An equal protection argument regarding IRCA would face
even more formidable hurdles. First, the same plenary power
would likely be invoked to reduce the level of scrutiny. More-
over, the IRCA restrictions on judicial review do not burden a
fundamental right in any recognized sense. Thus, there seems
little reason to think that an equal protection challenge to IRCA
would prevail or even reach the fundamental problems with the
statute.
2. Due Process
Due process seems to provide a better jurisprudential
framework for IRCA. In IMFA cases, the procedural due pro-
cess arguments proceed as follows:
1. The fifth amendment requires that due process be af-
forded whenever the government deprives any person of a con-
stitutionally protected interest;
2. This rule applies in the immigration context as well; and
3. The nature of procedural protections required depends
upon a balancing of interests, and due process is flexible.
Mathews v. Eldridge54 requires a balancing of:
1. The private interest affected by the government's action;
2. The risk of erroneous deprivation inherent in the gov-
ernment's chosen process and the probable value of additional
or substitute procedures; and
152 See Smith, 684 F. Supp. at 1119.
1-1 Id. at 1116. In Smith, the Government went'so far as to assert that "even mere
rational basis may be too strict a standard." Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 9 n.6, Smith, 684 F. Supp. 1113 (on file with the
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review).
1- 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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3. The government's interest, including the burden that
additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. 155
Although this line of argument is now well-entrenched in
constitutional jurisprudence, it is not likely to succeed in the
immigration context. The first problem arises in identifying the
constitutionally protected interest affected. Prior to IMFA, the
few cases that had any success in this regard focused upon
substantial burdens on family relationships. 156 In the IMFA
cases, courts regarded the right to marriage as fundamental. 57
Nevertheless, immigration principles providing minimal due
process rights to aliens have been held to trump such interests.5 8
With IRCA, the burden upon families is even. more attenuated.1 9
Second, and more important, the approach of defining the
right first and then determining the process due leaves the door
open for a devaluation of the alien's right to fair procedures. A
much criticized variant of this theory of due process was re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education
v. Loudermill.161 The Court held that when accepting govern-
ment employment or benefits, people are not required to take
155 See id. But in every case there must be an opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id. at 335. The Mathews formula itself
raises questions in the immigration context. Immigration cases have distinguished the
due process rights of arriving aliens in exclusion proceedings, returning residents in
exclusion proceedings, respondents in deportation proceedings, and those seeking ben-
efits under the immigration laws. The balancing of private and government interests in
the immigration setting invokes an instrumentalist view of due process. Though this
aspect of Matheiws is latent in domestic situations as well, immigration doctrines ex-
acerbate the instrumentalist tilt and indicate that, for a variety of historical and theo-
retical reasons, traditional due process analysis in the immigration mode will be unlikely
to overturn IRCA's judicial review mechanism.
156 See Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Mass. 1986) (INS marriage procedures
must afford due process to those involved, though the requirements of due process are
flexible subject to a balancing of competing interests); Stokes v. INS, 393 F. Supp. 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (INS procedures to determine bona fide marriage held subject to
constitutional scrutiny on fourth amendment grounds because they involve a protected
liberty interest). But these cases involved challenges to the administration of the law,
not the law itself.
151 See Almario v. Attorney General, 872 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
Congress could nevertheless interfere with marriage rights in the area of immigration).
158 "[T]he Constitution does not recognize the right of a citizen spouse to have his
or her alien spouse remain in this country." Id.
1-9 Congress, however, has apparently been moved by the plight of ineligible family
members of successful amnesty applicants. A piece of immigration legislation recently
passed by the Senate would protect such people from deportation. See S.358, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
1- 470 U.S. 532 (1984).
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the bitter with the sweet. The Court explained that "the Due
Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life,
liberty and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of sub-
stance and procedure are distinct . . . . 'Property' cannot be
defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more
than can life or liberty.' 1 61
Fair consideration of IRCA's judicial review mechanism,
requires an extension of the Loudermil! approach toimmigration
law. IRCA grants a benefit: amnesty. Its judicial review mech-
anism, however, as argued below, does not meet due process
requirements.
III. The Serious Constitutional Questions Raised by
Congressional Limitations of Access to Federal Courts
A. The Judicial Approach to Congressional Limitations of
Review Outside of the Immigration Context
IRCA conditions judicial review upon completion of an
ineffective administrative process. Legalization, a benefit, is
offered within the context of a burden, for all who were eligible
for legalization were subject to deportation. This approach
evokes a line of cases involving the Selective Service, in which
statutory benefits, exemptions, were available within the frame-
work of a burden, general conscription. The Selective Service
cases raised the same questions as IRCA:
1. To what extent will courts permit Congress to mandate
exhaustion of futile pre-judicial procedures?
2. How does the characterization of a challenge to those
procedures as constitutional affect the calculus?
3. To what extent can the procedures themselves or their
collateral consequences, like imprisonment, raise constitutional
problems? 162
161 Id. at 541.
, 162 See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (statute prohibiting review
of decisions of law and fact in the administration of a benefits system does not extend
to challenges of benefits denial on constitutional grounds).
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1. The Problem of Futile Pre-Judicial Procedures
In Falbo v. United States,163 a Jehovah's Witness was clas-
sified by his local draft board as a conscientious objector and
ordered to report to a civilian public service camp. When he
failed to report, he was indicted under the Selective Service
Training Act of 1940 for willful failure to perform a duty required
by the Act. The mobilization system established by the Act
provided for local boards to classify registrants based on infor-
mation from a questionnaire and, where appropriate, a physical
examination. The registrant could appeal his classification to a
board of appeal and, in certain cases, to the President. Once
the classification procedure was exhausted, the registrant was
ordered either to report for induction or to a public service camp
in the case of conscientious objectors. 164 The Supreme Court
held that judicial review of the local board's classification was
not available in the criminal prosecution for willful violation of
the order to report, even though he had exhausted all adminis-
trative review of the classification issue itself. The majority
avoided concluding that there is no constitutional right to judi-
cial review of the validity of the local board's classification when
it stated:
Even if there were, as the petitioner argues, a consti-
tutional requirement that judicial review must be avail-
able to test the validity of the decision of the local
board, it is certain that Congress was not required to
provide for judicial intervention before final acceptance
of an individual for national service. 65
Falbo is important to the analysis of IRCA because the
Court mandated exhaustion of an essentially unrelated proce-
dure-application for admission to the camp. The Court sug-
gested that Falbo, had he reported, might still have been rejected
163 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
'6 See id. at 552-53. He further argued that the Act did not make criminal his
failure to report for duty because the order to report was mistaken and there could be
no duty to comply with a mistaken order.
165 Id. at 554.
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for physical or mental reasons, 166 even though there was nothing
in the record to suggest that rejection was anything more than
an abstract possibility. Falbo indicates, that absent some indi-
cation of congressional intent to permit judicial review, courts
may require exhaustion of futile procedures.
But two years later, in Estep v. United States,167 the Court
allowed a registrant who had reported for induction, was ac-
cepted, but refused to report for duty, to obtain judicial review
of the local board's classification. The Court acknowledged that
in the absence of a constitutional requirement, Congress could
grant or withhold judicial review. But the Court held that courts
could consider whether a local board had acted beyond its ju-
risdiction by basing its classification on impermissible factors
such as race, creed or color.168 Justice Douglas distinguished
Falbo as follows: "In the Falbo case the defendant challenged
the order of his local board before he had exhausted his admin-
istrative remedies . . . . Submission to induction would be
satisfaction of the orders of the local boards, not a further step
to obtain relief from them."' 69 The Court again did not hold that
a constitutional right to judicial review existed in this context,
but noted in dicta that "[j]udicial review may indeed be required
by the Constitution.' 70
Taken together, Falbo and Estep demonstrate an approach
that the Court might take with IRCA.171 Since other relief might
be available in deportation, the Court could decide that appli-
cants can be compelled to undergo those proceedings. But this
approach has two significant problems. First, it ignores the prob-
lem of confidentiality. Even if effective collateral relief could be
granted in the deportation venue, the applicant's vulnerability
to deportation is increased once confidentiality is breached.
166 See id. at 553.
,67 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
168 See id. at 120-21.
169 Id. at 123.
170 Id. at 120, citing Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). Ng Fung Ho held
that in habeas corpus proceedings to test the validity of a judicial order, the petitioner
was entitled to a de novo judicial trial on a claim of citizenship.
171 It has been noted that Falbo and Estep are perhaps more properly viewed as
involving the doctrine of ripeness than exhaustion. See Donahue, The Supreme Court
vs. Section 10(b)(3) of the Selective Service Act: A Study in Ducking Constitutional
Issues, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 908, 914-15 (1970). The important point is that both of these
doctrines are judicial gatekeeping mechanisms, and as such are malleable.
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Second, the mere possibility that a process might grant relief
should not be dispositive. Courts should fairly consider the real
prospects of a particular applicant obtaining relief that is equiv-
alent to amnesty. But to make this determination a court would
have to engage in extensive fact-finding. Thus, if it were to be
conducted fairly, the Falbo approach to IRCA would likely
involve as much of a judicial role as the review of a denial, with
much greater hardship for the applicant.
The Court in Falbo and Estep implicitly accepted the notion
that Congress' article III power to limit jurisdiction is not unlim-
ited. Recent cases illustrate the complexity of this limitation. In
1967, Congress barred any pre-induction judicial review of "the
classification or processing of any registrant by local boards...
except as a defense to criminal prosecution [for failure to report
for induction]."'' 72 This provision was first reviewed by the Su-
preme Court in Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local
Board No. 11,1 73 which involved the revocation of a statutory
exemption in what was held to be a "blatantly lawless" man-
ner. 74 Oestereich, a divinity student, was reclassified 1-A for
turning in his registration certificate to protest the Vietnam war.
He then sought pre-induction judicial review. His case was dis-
missed below. The Supreme Court held that the district court
had jurisdiction to restrain his induction. The Court did not find
the relegation of review to a criminal defense to be unconstitu-
tional per se. Rather, the decision was based upon the conflict
between Section 6(g) of the Act, which mandated the ministerial
exemption, and the new Section 10(b)(3), which barred pre-
induction review. 175 One commentator has speculated that Oes-
tereich implicitly holds that Congress cannot create a substan-
tive right without providing the holder of the right a civil means
of vindication prior to being deprived of liberty. 176 But the Oes-
tereich holding is ambiguous at best, based ostensibly upon the
'7 Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(8), 81 Stat. 100, 104 (amending Military Selective Service
Act, § 10(b)(3)) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1982)). This
provision responded to pre-induction relief granted to draft registrants reclassified 1-A
for participating in antidraft demonstrations. See Wolffv. Selective Service Local Board
No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
17 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
171 Id. at 238.
71 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
176 See Donahue, supra note 171, at 919.
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clear departure of the Board from its statutory mandate. 177 Jus-
tice Harlan, however, in a concurring opinion, argued that Sec-
tion 10(b)(3) could not bar review of claims that the statute or
regulations were facially invalid, for "[t]o withhold pre-induction
review in this case would thus deprive petitioner of his liberty
without the prior opportunity to present to any competent
forum-agency or court-his substantial claim that he was or-
dered inducted pursuant to an unlawful procedure. Such an
interpretation . . . would raise serious constitutional problems
"178
The ambiguity of Oestereich was exacerbated by Clark v.
Gabriel,179 a case decided the same day, in which the Court
addressed the question of whether the local board's denial of a
claim of classification as a conscientious objector could be ju-
dicially reviewed other than as required by Section 10(b)(3). The
Court unanimously found no constitutional objection. 80 Oester-
eich was distinguished as having involved a challenge to the
board's statutory authority to act, as opposed to a claim that
the board reached a wrong decision in Gabriel.'8' The Court in
Oestereich expanded a concept first raised in Estep: only orders
of local boards "within their respective jurisdictions" are
"final.",' 82
7 "We deal with the conduct of a local board that is basically lawless.
Oestereich, 393 U.S. at 237.
178 Id. at 243 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[- 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per curiam).
1o
We find no Constitutional objection to Congress' thus requiring that asser-
tion of a conscientious objector's claims ... be deferred until after induction,
if that is the course he chooses, whereupon habeas corpus would be an available
remedy, or until defense of the criminal prosecution which would follow should
he ... refus[e] to submit to induction.
Id. at 259.
181 See Donahue, supra note 171, at 921. Subsequent cases did little to clarify
matters. See, e.g., Fein v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 7, 405 U.S. 365
(1972) (claim that the entire procedure for determining conscientious objector status
violated due process rejected on the grounds that Fein did not claim an objection or
deferment on the basis of objectively established and conceded status); Breen v. Selec-
tive Service Local Board No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970) (student denied deferment based
on unauthorized regulation held to have right to judicial review as board's order was a
clear departure from its statutory mandate); Boyd v. Clark, 393 U.S. 316 (1969) (per
curiam) (equal protection challenge to system of student deferments held barred by
§ 10(b)(3)).
'8 Estep, 327 U.S. at 120.
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The doctrine, as expressed by case law in the area of
congressional limitation of judicial review similar to IRCA, is
non-predictive. The Selective Service cases demonstrate the
following:
1. The judiciary is aware that the relationship between ar-
ticle III and the due process clause of the fifth amendment is
complex;
2. Judges have strained statutory interpretation to avoid
grappling with this constitutional complexity;
3. Claims that a statute or regulation is facially invalid are
more likely to override congressional limitations than direct
appeals;'83
4. The standards for determining when a claim is truly
constitutional are elusive;
5. A clear departure of an agency from its statutory man-
date may give rise to a constitutional claim; and
6. War and wartime exigencies significantly affect the due
process balancing engaged in by courts. 84
B. The Constitution and IRCA: What Can and Should Be
Done?
The IRCA judicial review scheme appears contradictory in
guaranteeing confidentiality while demanding surrender by those
I83 As one court has recently noted: "[I]n the entire history of the United States,
the Supreme Court has never once held that Congress may foreclose all judicial review
of the constitutionality of a congressional enactment." Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Thus, the Supreme Court has not addressed "the 'serious consti-
tutional question' that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any
judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim." Webster v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. 2047,
2056 (1988). See M. Redish & S. Bice, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation
of Judicial Power 7-34 (1980); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Con-
stitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17 (1981). Even as to non-constitutional claims, however,
the Supreme Court begins with a "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial
review of agency action." Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 470 U.S.
667, 670 (1986). "[C]lear and convincing evidence" is required to rebut this presumption.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974).
114 As to IRCA, the possible analogy between the war power and the source of
congressional and executive power to control immigration is worth considering. As
discussed above, courts often have exhibited deference in immigration cases that is
second only to that granted to war. But limiting judicial review in amnesty cases can
hardly be considered equivalent to the issues confronting Congress during World War
II.
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who seek judicial review. Its requirement of exhausting an in-
effective and dangerous administrative process is also uniquely
harsh. Neither traditional immigration law nor traditional limi-
tation of review doctrine seem easily able to reach the funda-
mental questions raised by this statute, since the immigration
context implicates so many other concerns about the source of
rights and the power of government. The basic question, then,
is whether undocumented aliens can use due process as an
idealistic trump of Congress' article III powers when those pow-
ers are exercised in a fundamentally unjust manner.
The injustice of IRCA seems patent. Consider the following
paradigm:
1. You cannot play outside today. I don't have time to
explain why' now, but I have my reasons and it's up to me.
2. You can play outside today if you do all of your chores
first. I will decide if you've done them properly.
3. You can play outside today if you do all of your chores.
Your older brother will decide if you've done them properly. If
you think your brother has decided unfairly, I will take a look.
4. You can play outside today if you do all your chores.
Your older brother will decide if you've done them properly. If
you think your brother has decided unfairly, and you want me
to decide, you must confess something serious that you did
wrong that I do not know about. If I decide your brother was
wrong, I will let you play outside and forgive the other thing.
But if I decide your brother was right, you cannot play outside
and you will be punished further for the other thing.
There is something fundamentally troubling about condi-
tioning justice upon risk. In light of this basic unfairness, it is
disconcerting that the statute might withstand challenges which
relied solely upon precedent or well-accepted doctrine. IRCA
illustrates the importance of a theory of due process that views
freedom from at least extreme adjudicative arbitrariness and
irrationality as an inalienable right. It is not necessary finally to
decide whether this right derives from the Kantian injunction to
treat others as ends and not means, from a slightly expanded
view of the "morality" that makes law possible, 185 from a mod-
,S5 See L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-94 (1964).
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ified Kantian "constructivist" theory, 8 6 from a model that sees
"law as integrity,"'' 7 or from a recognition of the development
of a more "communitarian" order.18 8 The important thing is that
"[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is
surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term.' ' 8 9 The
IRCA scheme of judicial review therefore not only implicates
the appearance of justice, but the essence of justice itself.
There are three possible solutions to IRCA's problems:
1. The Justice Department can promulgate regulations
which permit Us to decide legalization cases de novo. This
,86 See Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority in Liberty, Equality, and Law:
Selected Tanner Lectures on Moral Philosophy 1-87 (S. McMurrin ed. 1987).
1B7
[T]he best defense of political legitimacy-the right of a political community
to treat its members as having obligations in virtue of collective community
decisions-is to be found not in the hard terrain of contracts or duties ofjustice
or obligations of fair play that might hold among strangers, where philosophers
have hoped to find it, but in the more fertile ground of fraternity, community,
and their attendant obligations.
R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 206 (1986). This approach seems likely to help IRCA
applicants, but less likely to accord any rights (within the integrity model) to newly
arriving immigrants or refugees.
B8
The legal order, animated by the emergence of new, "communitarian" public
law norms, has gradually begun to generalize from [the] natural rights dimen-
sion of liberalism. These norms are expanding and transfiguring the sources
of, and justifications for, legal obligation to individuals whom public and private
law traditionally conceived of as "strangers." . . . They imply that socially
accepted values should augment consent as a basis for imputing legal duties
Schuck, supra note 1, at 49-50. This communitarian approach, based upon "functional
social linkages actually forged between aliens and the American people," id. at 50,
would certainly appear to help IRCA applicants, but not detained incoming refugees.
Like other theorists, Schuck distinguishes communitarianism from traditional indivi-
dualistic liberalism. This results in his tacit acceptance of the due process right being
weighed according to the amount of integration an alien has already achieved. See
Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum
and Beyond, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 165 (1983). Though better than rigid, formalistic
distinctions based on technical status, this is a hard calculus to imagine working in
practice. Nor does it seem especially satisfying in theory, especially as applied to
refugees. See Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response To
Martin, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237, 240-45 (1983). See also Smolla, The Reemergence of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: Tile Price of Protesting Too Much,
35 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1982) for the argument that the right-privilege distinction partakes
of valid and lasting legal norms. If Smolla is correct, then one must certainly be less
optimistic about the Loudermill approach being extended to immigration law, perhaps
the stronghold of the right-privilege dichotomy.
"9 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1981).
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procedure is not clearly prohibited by IRCA's limitation of ad-
ministrative or judicial review, and is in keeping with the ap-
parent reliance by Congress upon the adjustment model. The
problem of confidentiality remains, however. The best solution
to this dilemma would be regulations which create a special
"final order of deportability" for cases in which legalization has
been denied and the applicant desires judicial review. This spe-
cial final order would incorporate IRCA's confidentiality guar-
antees. In addition, the regulation should require that, if the
IRCA appeal is not sustained, motions to reopen would be
granted to permit the applicant to request other available forms
of relief from deportation. This regulatory solution maintains
the primary congressional intent of limiting access to district
courts for review of denials. Though it might burden the immi-
gration courts to some extent, this burden seems reasonable
under the circumstances.
2. Applicants who desire judicial review of amnesty denials
can petition the district court for relief. If the district court were
to find the judicial review scheme unconstitutional it could un-
dertake a number of ameliorative actions: remand the case to
the INS, decide the case, or most problematically, somehow
send the case to the court of appeals for Section 106 review.
This last possibility also raises the option of going directly to
the court of appeals and arguing that the jurisdictional limita-
tions contained in IRCA are unconstitutional and should be
waived.
3. Congress can amend IRCA expressly to permit IJs to
hear legalization cases under the conditions described in para-
graph (1) above. This last suggestion is obviously the most
elegant and direct. Practically, of course, it would be difficult
to achieve. Moreover, in light of the historical problems created
by Section 106, it would be wiser for Congress to take the
opportunity to reconsider the mechanism of attempting to force
all deportation cases into the court of appeals.
Conclusion
IRCA was the most significant congressional foray into
immigration law in more than thirty years. The basic tensions
underlying American immigration law are clearly reflected in
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many of its substantive provisions. Its scheme for judicial re-
view, however, is uniquely unfair. Whether the result of inad-
vertence, expediency, or underlying assumptions about the due
process rights of aliens, the IRCA system raises profound ques-
tions. To answer these questions, a reexamination of both im-
migration doctrine and the extent to which aliens are protected
by the Constitution is required. In light of its harsh effects in
practice, and its-potential as precedent, IRCA warrants, if not
immediate revision, at least this most serious and careful
analysis.
